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Is Hobby Lobby Really A Brave New World?




In Act V of The Tempest, Miranda sees for the first time in her
life people other than her father, the magician Prospero, and her
fiance, Ferdinand. She famously exclaims:
0, wonder!
How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! 0 brave new world,
That has such people in't!'
Prospero-who knows the men Miranda is seeing for the first time,
and that they are far from "goodly"-responds with a certain amount
of world-weariness:
'Tis new to thee.
2
During the Hobby Lobby litigation and after the case was
decided, I felt a lot like Prospero' In the months prior to and since
the June 2014 decision, the exclamations of consternation, delight,
and above all, hyperbole, came at a furious rate from public
commentators and legal scholars. Yet from my perspective as a
* Deputy General Counsel, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The views
expressed in this essay are mine alone and do not necessarily the views of the Becket Fund
or its clients. Many thanks to Mark Rienzi and the editors of the Hastings Constitutional
Law Quarterly for their comments on an earlier draft.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act V, sc. 1, THE RIVERSIDE
SHAKESPEARE 1634 (Houghton Mifflin 1974).
2. Id.
3. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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religious liberty advocate who has frequently litigated Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")4 and similar "substantial
burden" claims for over ten years, the response seemed overwrought,
bordering on the unhinged. As far as the law went, Hobby Lobby
was a simple case, very much like the numerous other substantial
burden cases that courts have been deciding for years. Professor
Posner was not far off when he declared it "a bore" in Slate Nor
does Hobby Lobby herald a new world of rampant religious freedom
claims by for-profit corporations.6 But that is not how (most of) the
press nor (most of) the academy treated the case. And that poses the
interesting questions of how and why the press and the academy have
gotten Hobby Lobby so wrong and how we might objectively
evaluate their assessments of the case's effects.
In this brief essay, I will first describe past RFRA/substantial
burden cases and the social narrative that typically frames them.
Second, I will examine how the press and the academy treated Hobby
Lobby differently than other RFRA cases. Third, I will describe
some public predictions opponents have made about Hobby Lobby's
effects in the specific area of religious exercise by for-profit
corporations. Finally, I will explain why those predictions are likely
to be wrong and offer a counter-prediction of my own: religious
exercise claims by for-profit corporations will remain relatively rare.
I. Press and Scholarly Attention to Religious Liberty Cases
Generally
I have litigated cases in the religious liberty space for more than
a decade. During that time, I have represented many unpopular
religious groups in cases litigated under the "substantial burden"
standard first articulated in Sherbert v. Verner7 and later codified in
civil rights statutes such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.8
One example of an unpopular religious liberty client of ours was
a Santerfa priest named Jos6 Merced, who was involved in a goat
4. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb etseq. (2013).
5. Eric Posner, Religious people have rights, too-and that's why Hobby Lobby
threatens liberals, SLATE (June 27, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and
-politics/the..breakfast-table/features/2014/scotus-roundup/supremecourt_2014_hobbyl
obby is-a bore.html.
6. As it happened, only two Justices agreed with the government's argument that
for-profit corporations cannot engage in religious exercise. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
at 2787, 2793 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
7. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb etseq. (2013).
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sacrifice case.9 From 2008 to 2009, we litigated the Merced v. Kasson
appeal at the Fifth Circuit under the substantial burden standard set
forth in the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act.'0 Mr. Merced
lived in Euless, a suburb of Dallas. For many years he conducted
Santeria religious ceremonies in his home." These ceremonies
included the ritual sacrifice and consumption of various animals.
12
After an anonymous tip to the police, the City of Euless threatened to
prosecute Mr. Merced if he continued with his religious exercise."
A fundamental premise of our litigation strategy in the Merced
case was that goat sacrifice would never be popular in Texas. We
assumed that some significant percentage of observers, perhaps a
supermajority, would at least initially find the practice upsetting or
abhorrent. We also thought that many judges might find animal
sacrifice, at the very least, unfamiliar. We tried to preempt the likely
distaste for our client's religious practice upfront, both in court, and
when we received inquiries from the press.
However, the case did not receive much press attention. Very
few newspapers or scholars paid much attention when the Fifth
Circuit ruled in favor of our client, applying Texas' RFRA to protect
Mr. Merced's ability to engage in sacrifice.4
Another unpopular client was the Islamic Center of
Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Islamic Center of Murfreesboro v.
Rutherford County, Tennessee concerned our client's ability to build a
new mosque next to a Baptist church in a small Tennessee city.
During the course of the dispute, the mosque construction site was
vandalized and some of the construction equipment was set on fire.6
Neighbors who opposed the mosque sued in state probate court
seeking to overturn the approval for the mosque on the grounds that
the permit hearing should have been advertised more widely in light






15. See Islamic Ctr. of Murfreesboro & Ossama Bahloul v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn.,
No. 3:12-cv-0738, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99709 (M.D. Tenn., filed July 18, 2012).
16. See Robbie Brown & Christine Hauser, After Attacks and Threats, Tennessee
Mosque Opens, N.Y. TIMES NEWS BLOG (Aug. 10, 2012, 4:47 PM), http://thelede.blogs.ny
times.com/2012/08/10/after-attacks-and-threats-tennessee-mosque-opens/.
Summer 2015]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
of the mosque's supposedly controversial nature.7 The state probate
court ruled in their favor.8 We then filed a separate federal lawsuit
on behalf of the mosque, seeking the immediate issuance of an
occupancy permit under the federal Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"),' 9 which, like RFRA,
includes the "substantial burden" standard." The Department of
Justice filed a parallel federal action on behalf of the United States
seeking the same relief.' The federal district court judge in Nashville
ruled in favor of our client and the congregation was able to move
into its new building in time for Ramadan.22
Other unpopular clients who have relied on the "substantial
burden" standard include synagogues with neighbors who sought to
prevent them from expanding their sanctuary,23 Sikhs who want to
carry kirpans into federal buildings,24 Jewish prisoners who want
kosher diets,25 and minority congregations who were unwanted in
particular neighborhoods.6
Although these cases frequently receive press coverage and the
attention of scholars, in general, the public, the press, or the academy
have not treated them as landmark cases. Federal courts simply
applied the straightforward "substantial burden" standard and
provided relief to the plaintiffs; few took note.
17. See Fisher v. Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission, No.10CV1443
(Tenn. Chancery Ct. (June 1, 2012) (unpub.).
18. See United States v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 3775980 at
*2-3 (M.D. Tenn., filed Aug. 29, 2012).
19. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
(2013).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
21. See United States v. Rutherford Cnty., Tenn., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 3775980 at
*2-3 (M.D. Tenn., filed Aug. 29, 2012).
22. See Rutherford Cnty., Tenn., 2012 WL 2930076. The angry neighbors continued
their lawsuit until it was denied by the United States Supreme Court. See Fisher v.
Rutherford Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n, No. M2012-01397-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL
2382300 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2707 (2014).
23. See, e.g., Congregation Kol Ami v. Abington Twp., No. Civ. A. 01-1919, 2004 WL
1837037 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2004).
24. See Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013).
25. See, e.g., Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 709 F.3d 487 (5th Cir.
2013); Rich v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013); Benning v.
Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2004).
26. See, e.g., Albanian Associated Fund v. Twp. of Wayne, No. 06-CV-3217 (PGS),
2007 WL 2904194 at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2007) (Albanian mosque not allowed to build new
building in Wayne, New Jersey).
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But Hobby Lobby was different. The level of attention that the
Hobby Lobby litigation received differed by many orders of
magnitude from other religious liberty cases. For example, one rough
measure of societal attention is number of hits on Google related to a
particular topic. A Google search for the words "Hobby Lobby case"
reveals 139,000 hits.27 Yet a Google search for the words "Hosanna-
Tabor case"8-another Supreme Court case that involved
fundamental First Amendment issues-reveals only 2,520 hits.2 9 Even
accounting for the 2.5-year time gap between the two cases, this
comparison tends to suggest that the level of attention paid to Hobby
Lobby has been more than fifty times the level of attention paid to
Hosanna- Tabor.
Scholars have also paid far more attention to Hobby Lobby than
other religious liberty cases heard by the Supreme Court. A search of
SSRN using Google reveals 4,520 scholarly articles that mention
"Hobby Lobby."30 Yet there are only 845 that mention "Hosanna-
Tabor."31  Given that scholarly articles usually need a significant
amount of lead-time before publication, it seems clear that a rash of
scholarly articles mentioning Hobby Lobby were rushed out both
before and after the decision in late June 2014.
So why the difference in the level of attention? It was not
because there was a doctrinal difference-Hobby Lobby was litigated
under the same "substantial burden" standard as all of the cases I
listed above. Nor was it because the case stood for some novel legal
proposition; in fact, the doctrinal issues were far simpler than those at
stake in other Supreme Court cases the Becket Fund has handled in
recent years.32 Hosanna-Tabor, for example, represented a much
more fundamental shift in the law than did Hobby Lobby, and dealt
with constitutional issues rather than statutory ones.
I have a theory about why Hobby Lobby received more
attention: people have something to gain from hyping Hobby Lobby.
Take the defendants themselves. One explanation for the
Department of Justice's oddly aggressive litigation strategy in the
contraceptive mandate cases is political. I have no doubt that
27. Author's own search (conducted Apr. 20,2015).
28. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp't
Opportunity Comm'n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
29. Author's own search (conducted Apr. 20, 2015).
30. Author's own search (conducted Apr. 20,2015).
31. Author's own search (conducted Apr. 20,2015).
32. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694.
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decision makers at the Department of Health and Human Services
and the Department of Justice took into account the political
overtones of the litigation. I also do not doubt that there were
political operatives who might normally side with the Departments,
but were happy that the government lost Hobby Lobby, especially
since the decision came only four months before the Congressional
midterm elections and thus could be deployed as part of particular
political narrative.
The press also had a strong interest in hyping Hobby Lobby and
the contraceptive mandate litigation generally. Anything related to
the Affordable Care Act receives a lot of media attention, and the
litigation has additional thematic overlays of religion, sex, and
corporations. That means more page views, more papers sold, and
ultimately more revenue.
Scholars also have self-interested reasons to hype Hobby Lobby.
Since it involves a prominent Supreme Court case and issues that are
receiving a lot of media attention, articles about Hobby Lobby are
much more likely to be accepted at student-run law reviews.
Additionally, accepted articles can translate into tenure, higher
academic status, or a position on a higher ranked law school faculty.
Thus, unlike any of the many preceding "substantial burden"
religious liberty cases that garnered far less scholarly attention,
Hobby Lobby has the prospect of launching many an academic
career.
If different groups have a strong self-interest in hyping Hobby
Lobby generally, they also have a particular interest in making
hyperbolic predictions about the results of Hobby Lobby. A case that
is a legal "bore" and thus results in little change in the law as applied
by the courts across the country does not serve those (often financial)
interests as well as a case that represents a major change in the
underlying law. Thus the groups all have strong incentives to claim
that Hobby Lobby represents a major change, even if it does not.
In the remainder of this essay I describe some of these
predictions in one area concerning Hobby Lobby-religious exercise
by for-profit corporations-and then explain why I think these
predictions are wrong.
[Vol. 42:4
II. Predictions Regarding the Effects of Hobby Lobby on For-
Profit Religious Exercise Claims
It is not hard to find parades of horribles about Hobby Lobby.
Indeed, prominent Washington Post columnist Ruth Marcus entitled
one of several columns about the case "Supreme Court Hobby Lobby
ruling could start a 'parade of horribles."'33  In the article, Marcus
reviews different claims about possible corporate free exercise claims,
reciting the potential for Exxon to bring a religious exercise claim, or
for a company to object o paying for blood transfusions (presumably
in a reference to Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs).4  She then
concludes-without offering support for her conclusion-"the minute
the court opens this door, there are going to be a lot of corporate fists
waving.""
Similarly, prominent Supreme Court commentator and journalist
Jeffrey Toobin published a post-Hobby Lobby column entitled "On
Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg Was Right.,36 In it he cites the ill
effects predicted by Justice Ginsburg in her Hobby Lobby dissent,
and then claims to prove them true. However, the argument rests
almost entirely on evidentiary rulings in a single court case from Utah
(which I discuss in more detail below), other contraceptive mandate
cases, and various RFRA claims (regarding issues like union
organizing at religious colleges) that have been brought but have not
been successful. He concludes with the same open-door metaphor as
Marcus: "the Supreme Court, having opened the door to these cases,




Scholars are not much different. At the Supreme Court, a group
of forty-four corporate law scholars submitted an amicus brief
describing what they said would be the bad effects of recognition of a
for-profit corporation's ability to engage in religious exercise.
3
1
Among other things, the scholars claimed that allowing for-profit
33. Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Hobby Lobby ruling could start a 'parade of





36. Jeffrey Toobin, On Hobby Lobby, Ginsburg Was Right, THE NEW YORKER
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/hobby-lobbys-troubling-
aftermath.
37. Id.
38. See Amicus Curie Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors for
Petitioners, No. 13-354, 13-356, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013).
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corporations to engage in religious exercise would incentivize
"subterfuge":
Are federal courts prepared to adjudicate complex
(and potentially intrusive) questions of whether a
given corporation is invoking religion merely as a
subterfuge to gain an economic advantage over
competitors, rather than in "good faith" (however a
court might define that term)?
39
They claimed it would be easy for corporations to have a "'Road to
Damascus' conversion" in order to make additional profits. °
According to the forty-four professors, this all results in a "slippery
slope" that they urged the Supreme Court to avoid.41 But in the
assessment of other corporate law scholars writing in the Harvard
Law Review Forum, the forty-four professors' brief "parades
horribles" without any real factual basis.2  Nevertheless, other
scholarly claims of terrible effects from Hobby Lobby abound.43
With respect to the more scholarly predictions, one positive
aspect of these public predictions is that they are testable.44 That is,
after time passes, we can look at the predictions and determine
whether the scholars making them were right or wrong. Those
making the predictions can then be held to account-asked to explain
why their predictions deviated from the actually observed results and
39. Id. at 27; see also id. at 25-28.
40. Id. at 27.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the
Theory of the Firm, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 291 (May 20, 2014) ("For over half a
century, then, there has been no per se bar to free exercise claims by for-profit
corporations, and the parade of horribles envisioned by the scholars has simply not
materialized."); see also id. at 291 n.119 (citing David Skeel, Corporations and Religious
Freedom, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2012 (expressing doubt that a Supreme Court ruling in
favor of Hobby Lobby will lead to "a massive wave of corporate religious freedom
claims")).
43. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35 (2015); Jennifer Jorczak, "Not Like You and
Me": Hobby Lobby, the Fourteenth Amendment, and What the Further Expansion of
Corporate Personhood Means for Individual Rights, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 285 (2014);
Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343 (2014).
44. Newspaper columnists typically write their articles at a sufficiently high level of
generality that their claims cannot easily be tested.
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how their predictions might be improved in the future. With respect
to scholarly predictions, this can then be turned into a scoring system
for the accuracy of scholarly predictions, allowing non-academics
some insight into whether the predictions a particular scholar is
offering should be credited or not.
III. So Far, the Predictions Have Not Been Coming True
Although the verdict of history is not yet in, the evidence so far
does not support the horribles. In the nine and a half months since
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Hobby Lobby, the
predictions set out above have not fared too well. As of mid-April
2015, the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals have
applied Hobby Lobby just four times in any significant way, excluding
the immediate context of the contraceptive mandate litigation." The
horribles have not yet paraded, and there seems to be little prospect
that they will.
The Supreme Court first applied Hobby Lobby just seven
months after deciding it. In Holt v. Hobbs, the Court considered a
substantial burden claim from an Arkansas prisoner named Abdul
Muhammad.46 Muhammad sought to wear a half-inch beard in
accordance with his Muslim faith.47 But Arkansas is one of the few
states that banned beards for prisoners, so prison officials denied his
request.8 Muhammad, proceeding pro se, brought a claim under
RLUIPA, a federal civil rights law that protects religious exercise for
inmates.49 After a hearing before a magistrate judge, Muhammad lost
in both district court and at the Eighth Circuit."' But when
Muhammad applied pro se to Justice Alito for an injunction pending
a grant of certiorari, Justice Alito referred the application to the
45. Even within the context of the contraceptive mandate litigation, the applications
of Hobby Lobby by the courts of appeals have been very brief, or have gone against the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of
Health & Human Servs., 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2014) (briefly applying Hobby Lobby to
rule in favor of religious plaintiff); Priests For Life v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (distinguishing Hobby Lobby to rule against religious
plaintiff).
46. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq. (2013).
50. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 861.
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entire Court, and the Court granted the injunction." The Court then
considered and granted the petition for certiorari.2
The Supreme Court applied Hobby Lobby to rule unanimously
in favor of Muhammad.3 Although Hobby Lobby had been decided
under a different statute, RFRA, it shared the substantial burden
standard with RLUIPA. The Court first held that Arkansas had
imposed a substantial burden on Muhammad's religious exercise of
wearing a beard: "If petitioner contravenes [the no-beard] policy and
grows his beard, he will face serious disciplinary action. Because the
grooming policy puts petitioner to this choice, it substantially burdens
his religious exercise."" The Court then held that Arkansas had not
demonstrated that it had used the least restrictive means available of
meeting its stated interest in preserving prison security.55 This case
had little to do with corporate overreaching in the area of religious
exercise, but everything to do with the simple "substantial burden"
standard the Court also applied in Hobby Lobby.6 But that narrative
does not fit the doom-and-gloom predictions of Hobby Lobby
opponents.
Similarly, in Haight v. Thompson, the Sixth Circuit reversed
summary judgment, holding that five Native American prisoners on
death row in Kentucky could make out a claim under the "substantial
burden" standard in order to seek access to a religious sweat lodge.57
There, the Sixth Circuit relied on Hobby Lobby in interpreting
RLUIPA.5 And in Davila v. Gladden, the Eleventh Circuit applied
Hobby Lobby to RFRA claims brought by a Santerfa prisoner
incarcerated in a federal prison.'9 The Eleventh Circuit cited Hobby
Lobby seven times in ruling that the Bureau of Prisons had imposed a
substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise.'
In McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, the Fifth Circuit
ruled in favor of several Native Americans who had been prosecuted
51. Id. at 861-62.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 859.
54. Id. at 862.
55. Id. at 863-67.
56. Id. (citing Hobby Lobby nine times).
57. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014).
58. Id. at 569.
59. See Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015).
60. Id.
[Vol. 42:4
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for possessing eagle feathers they used in religious ceremonies.6' The
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the federal government defendants, relying primarily on
Hobby Lobby.6
In contrast to these many applications of Hobby Lobby by
Courts of Appeals that many observers are hard-put to criticize,
Hobby Lobby opponents have focused on a single, discovery-phase
Utah federal district court case that they say demonstrates the ill
effects of Hobby Lobby.6 In Perez v. Paragon Contractors, the
Department of Labor has been investigating a religious group, the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, for
alleged violations of child labor laws.6' The trial judge, relying on
RFRA and Hobby Lobby, has issued evidentiary rulings that have
limited the federal government's ability to enforce administrative
subpoenas against a witness alleged to be familiar with the inner
workings of the religious group.5  But contra Hobby Lobby's
opponents, Hobby Lobby does not have much to do with the Perez
case. The substantial burden standard the Perez court has been
applying is exactly the same standard that has existed in the Tenth
Circuit for years; the existence of Hobby Lobby made no difference
to the outcome.6 Moreover, according to the district court, the
government apparently made little effort to explain why it could not
obtain the information it wanted by other, less restrictive means.7
Indeed, if Perez is the best critics of Hobby Lobby can come up
with, they will not get too far. That is especially so in light of the
many different religious minorities-Muslim, Native American, and
61. See McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014).
62. Id. (citing Hobby Lobby eighteen times).
63. See Perez v. Paragon Contractors, Corp., No. 2:13CV00281-DS, 2014 WL 4628572
at *1 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2014). For an example of a critique based on the Perez case, see
Toobin, supra note 36. In the article, Toobin refers to a "sampling of court actions since
Hobby Lobby" but then cites only court actions in the Perez case and a ruling in another
contraceptive mandate case. Id. Most of the situations he invokes are unsuccessful RFRA
claims, or hypotheticals.
64. See Perez, 2014 WL 4628572 at *1.
65. Id. at *3.
66. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958-62 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying same
substantial burden standard). Indeed, in her concurring opinion in Holt, Justice
Sotomayor recognized this continuity, citing that same pre-Hobby Lobby Tenth Circuit
substantial burden standard. See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 867-868 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citing Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 59 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wilgus,
638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011)).
67. See Perez, 2014 WL 4628572 at *4.
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Santero-who are already benefiting from Hobby Lobby. And
notably, none of the cases turn on religious exercise by for-profit
corporations. Cases involving religious exercise by for-profit
corporations remain just as rare as they were before Hobby Lobby.
IV. Why Religious Exercise Claims By For-Profit
Organizations Will Remain Rare
For-profit organizations are quite unlikely to raise a large
number of religious liberty claims post-Hobby Lobby. In fact, the
greatest number of religious liberty claims will remain prisoner claims
under RLUIPA and religious land use claims by non-profit houses of
worship, also brought under RLUIPA. State RFRA claims in general
will also remain rare.68 There are several factors that will make
religious liberty claims by for-profit entities relatively rare.
A. Sincerity
One reason religious exercise claims by for-profit organizations
will be rare is that all religious exercise claims, whether under the
Constitution or federal civil rights laws, are subject to a sincerity
inquiry. 9 This is because unlike speech, when it comes to religious
exercise, the law uniformly demands that outward religious acts
manifest an inner belief." This principle holds true not just in the
United States, but across all Western legal systems-it inheres in the
nature of religious liberty.7 The Free Exercise Clause, RFRA,
68. See Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and
Under-Enforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021 (2012); Christopher C. Lund, Religious
Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
69. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 (discussing sincerity requirements).
70. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 (2005) (under RLUIPA, "prison
officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner's religiosity, asserted as the basis
for a requested accommodation, is authentic"); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457
(1971) ("'[T]he 'truth' of a belief is not open to question'; rather, the question is whether
the objector's beliefs are 'truly held"') (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185
(1965)); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (distinguishing
"freedom to believe" from "freedom to act").
71. Like Cantwell, international human rights instruments typically divide the right to
freedom of religion or belief into two parts-an absolute right to hold certain religious
beliefs, and a more limited right to manifest those beliefs in public. See, e.g., International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom,
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching."); European Convention
on Human Rights, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. no. 005 ("Everyone has the right to freedom
[Vol. 42:4
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RLUIPA, and other religious accommodation laws therefore all
require that the religious exercise in question be sincere .
There are several reasons that the universal sincerity
requirement will significantly limit the kind and number of religious
exercise claims that can be brought by for-profit organizations. In the
first instance, it stretches credulity to believe that any Fortune 500
for-profit corporation like Apple, Exxon, IBM, or Starbucks would
ever claim to be engaged in religious exercise. Since the law demands
a genuine connection to a religious conscience or "forum internum"'3
in order to make out a religious exercise claim, these companies will
not be able to make out a religious liberty claim, because they would
never assert that they possess such a religious conscience.
Moreover, in the context of large publicly held companies, there
is generally a significant divergence between ownership (i.e., the
shareholders), and control (i.e., the board of directors and
management). In Hobby Lobby, by contrast, five family members
owned and controlled the entire company, and had by means of a
trust arrangement subjected family members' continued ownership of
the company to adherence to specific religious beliefs.74
Perhaps most importantly, for most for-profit corporations there
would be significant downside costs to insincerity. A corporation that
represented that it had a religious belief to gain a legal or financial
advantage of some sort when it did not in fact possess that belief
would be liable for criminal or civil fraud.75 Individuals who falsely
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance."). Note that
international human rights instruments connect the manifestation part of the right to the
belief part of the protection.
72. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774 n.28 ("To qualify for RFRA's
protection, an asserted belief must be 'sincere'; a corporation's pretextual assertion of a
religious belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail."); Holt,
135 S. Ct. at 862 ("of course, a prisoner's request for an accommodation must be sincerely
based on a religious belief and not some other motivation"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 235 (1972) ("the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of
their religious beliefs" in supporting their claim under the Free Exercise Clause).
73. For a summary of how the terms "forum internum" and "forum externum" are
used in the international law of religious liberty, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Freedom of
Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice, 23 J.L. & RELIGION 763,
763-64 (2008) (book review).
74. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775-76.
75. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2013) (general federal criminal fraud statute); 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (criminalizing mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2013) (criminalizing wire
fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2013) (criminalizing securities fraud).
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testified that a corporation held a particular religious belief would be
liable for perjury.76 Publicly traded corporations would be liable for
securities laws violations.77
In short, the sincerity requirement presents a significant
78restriction on religious liberty claims by for-profit corporations.
B. Rarity of Government Interference With For-Profit Religious
Exercise
Another reason that religious exercise claims by for-profit
organizations will be rare is that government interference with for-
profit religious exercise is likely to remain rare. Most Americans and
most legislators support religious accommodations for dissenters,
shown by the wide array of religious accommodations that
governments of all sorts have put in place.79
This is not to say that government interference will not increase
in coming years, resulting in more conflicts. That much seems to be a
certainty, at least as long as government continues to expand its
regulations into new areas of human activity that will inevitably
involve religious people. But scale and scope matter, and this
category of litigation will never rise to the level of ubiquity that, for
example, employment discrimination lawsuits have.
C. Large Religious Non-Profit Organizations Have Brought Very Few
RFRA Claims in the Past
Another indicator tending to show that RFRA claims by for-
profit organizations will be small is the experience of large religious
non-profit organizations. By large religious non-profit organizations I
mean entities such as large private universities or private hospital
systems, which are typically organized as non-profit corporations.
Almost no one disputes that these large, somewhat commercial, and
heavily regulated religious non-profits are capable of engaging in
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2013) (criminalizing perjury).
77. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j (Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act).
78. For an in-depth treatment of the application of sincerity in the context of for-
profit religious exercise, see Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Questioning Sincerity: The
Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2014), available at
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/questioning-sincerity.
79. See generally Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State,
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015); Mark Rienzi, The Constitutional Right Not to Kill,
62 EMORY L.J. 121, 125-30 (2012) (describing conscience protections as to military
operations, capital punishment, assisted suicide, and abortion).
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religious exercise."' Although these large non-profit religious
organizations frequently interact with the federal government-as
contractors, as grantees, and as regulated entities-and can raise
RFRA claims, they have brought few such claims.81 The reality is that
large religious non-profits take advantage of certain custom-built
religious accommodations, but only infrequently raise the kinds of
claims that federal RFRA plaintiffs do."' Given the similarities
between religious for-profits and large religious non-profits, religious
for-profits are likely to raise RFRA claims just as infrequently.
Conclusion
So did Hobby Lobby create a brave new world of religious
claims by for-profit corporations? Only much more time will tell, but
my guess is that over time, Hobby Lobby will not be seen as a case
that significantly changed the trajectory of the law of religious liberty.
Instead, it will be seen as part of a broader continuum of substantial
burden cases that started long before Hobby Lobby and will continue
long after it. The difference will be that pundits and scholars will no
longer view what was decided in Hobby Lobby as something "new."
80. See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 2 (describing difference between "churches" and "religious
organizations" and defining religious organizations as entities that advance religion).
81. A search of all federal cases in the Westlaw database using the search terms
"RFRA" and "non-profit corporation" reveals just 68 cases. Author's own search
(conducted Apr. 20, 2015). Of those, the only cases where they can be said to involve
large non-profit corporations are challenges to the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive
mandate. See, e.g., Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dept. of Health
& Human Servs., 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2014). This tallies with Professor Lupu's survey
indicating that. 60% of pre-1997 RFRA claims were brought by prisoners. Ira C. Lupu,
The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 575, 591 (1998). His survey
shows conclusively that most claims were brought by individuals rather than non-profit
corporations; large non-profit corporations are barely represented. Id. at 603-17.
82. One example of religious accommodations for religious non-profits is Title VII's
religious exemption, which among other things, allows religious employers to show a
preference for co-religionist employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2013). The Supreme Court
upheld this religious accommodation in Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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